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Abstract
We analyze an agent-based model to estimate how the costs and benefits of users in an
online social network (OSN) impact the robustness of the OSN. Benefits are measured in
terms of relative reputation that users receives from their followers. They can be increased
by direct and indirect reciprocity in following each other, which leads to a core-periphery
structure of the OSN. Costs relate to the effort to login, to maintain the profile, etc. and are
assumed as constant for all users. The robustness of the OSN depends on the entry and exit
of users over time. Intuitively, one would expect that higher costs lead to more users leaving
and hence to a less robust OSN. We demonstrate that an optimal cost level exists, which
maximizes both the performance of the OSN, measured by means of the long-term average
benefit of its users, and the robustness of the OSN, measured by means of the life-time of
the core of the OSN. Our mathematical and computational analyses unfold how changes in
the cost level impact reciprocity and subsequently the core-periphery structure of the OSN,
to explain the optimal cost level.
Keywords: reciprocity, core-periphery network, cost-benefit relation, robustness, reputa-
tion
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSN), like other types of social organizations, undergo a steady evolution.
New users enter the network, while other users may decide to leave. New links between users
are formed online, based on shared information, friendship, common interests, etc., and existing
links may be deleted if users leave, or commonalities have changed. Under normal circumstances,
such events may not jeopardise the existence of the OSN, in particular if the OSN is still popular
and growing. However, loosing users and links can pose a serious risk to OSN, even for large
and successful ones on the scale of Twitter and Facebook. As a recent empirical study (Garcia
et al., 2013) has shown that the dropout of some users can trigger cascades of other users leaving,
which quickly accumulates to a level that threatens the existence of the OSN.
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In order to investigate the emergence and the impact of such cascades analytically and numer-
ically, we propose a model that explicitly considers the costs and benefits of users of an OSN.
Benefits are measured in terms of relative reputation (see Sect. 2.1), i.e. we take into account
(i) the number and the direction of links between users, and (ii) the impact of the reputation of
the counterparts on the reputation of a given user. A gain of reputation can be seen as a benefit
of being part of a social network. But there are also costs involved in being a member of an
OSN, even if they are implicit. These include, among others, the efforts to login, to maintain the
individual profile, to learn how to efficiently use the GUI of the provider, or the effort to adapt
to changes in the GUI.
Our model extends previous notions of reputation in social networks which are based on the
degree or the centrality of a user, measured by traditional centrality metrics (Gayo-Avello, 2013).
Different from such topological metrics, we define the reputation of a user based on the reputation
of those users that are linked to it. That means there is a value assigned to incoming and outgoing
links, as they increase either the own reputation or that of others. This implies to consider (i) a
directed network and (ii) a self-consistent dynamics of how reputation changes with the reputation
of others.
The assumption that individual reputation increases with the reputation of connected users
is quite common in different ranking schemes. For example, the earliest version of Google’s
PageRank algorithm calculates the rank of a website as a function of the ranks of the sites linking
to it. Similarly, the vulnerability of financial institutions can be calculated dependent on the
vulnerability of the conterparties connected to it (Battiston et al., 2012). In more general terms,
such an assumption follows (hetero)catalytic models e.g. from chemistry and biology, where the
concentration of a particular (chemical) species depends on the concentration of those species
that produce, or feed, it (Eigen and Schuster, 1979). I.e. models of prebiotic evolution or foodweb
interactions have already utilized such assumptions.
Jain and Krishna (1998) have combined this dynamics with a network dynamics that runs on a
different time scale. At each time step (measured in network time), the system was perturbed
by an extremal dynamics where the least performing node in the network was replaced by a new
node that randomly rewires itself back to the system. This model was already analyzed in detail
(Jain and Krishna, 2002a; Seufert and Schweitzer, 2007) and extended to cover other phenomena,
such as strategic link formation between economic agents (Koenig et al., 2009).
In this paper, we build on the existing model class, but extend it in a number of important points:
(i) Different from the simple extremal dynamics (where only one user is removed), we introduce
a condition for users to decide to leave, i.e. we allow many more users to leave dependent on their
personal cost-benefit ratio. (ii) We focus on the effects that cascades of users leaving have on
the robustness and the performance of the OSN. Performance is quantified using the long-term
average reputation of users (see also Sect. 3.1) and is taken as a systemic measure for the OSN
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rather than as an individual one. Robustness implies that the decision of users to leave the OSN
does not trigger large cascades of other users leaving. We will proxy this by means of the life
time of the core of the OSN (see also Sect. 2.3).
Our aim is not to focus on the size of cascades, which was done in different network approaches
to systemic risk (Lorenz et al., 2009; Tessone et al., 2013), but rather to understand the impact
that leaving users have on the OSN. As mentioned users will leave if their costs exceed their
benefits. Different from previous publications we vary this cost, which is the crucial parameter
in our model. Interestingly, we find that both the robustness and the performance of the OSN
are maximized for a non-zero cost of usage.
To explain this, we have to investigate how directed links impact the reputation across the OSN.
This leads us to the problem of reciprocity : If a user contributes to the reputation of others, she
may expect that these users in return also increase her own reputation. Mutual directed links
between two users, e.g. 1→ 2→ 1, would indicate direct reciprocity. But users can also indirectly
increase their reputation if they are part of a cycle, e.g. 1→ 2→ 3→ 1, which indicates indirect
reciprocity.
While direct and indirect reciprocity is advantageous for the OSN from a user perspective, it is not
well understood how reciprocity adds to systemic properties such as the robustness of the OSN.
We will address this question by a mathematical analysis that explains the impact such cycles on
the core-periphery structure of the OSN. Users that are part of a cycle are well integrated in the
OSN, maintain a high reputation and have little incentives to leave. But if users leave because
of bad cost-benefit ratio, this will impact the number and sizes of such cycles, which we need to
understand by means of an analytic approach that is complemented by computer simulations.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and the analytical framework to
analyse the structure of an OSN. Different Appendices allow to study this framework by following
concrete step-by-step examples. In Section 3 we present the results of computer simulations, to
demonstrate the emergence of an optimal cost value, and we discuss the impact of different model
parameters on the structure and the performance of the OSN. A discussion of the general insights
and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.
2 A reputation model
2.1 Costs and benefits
Why do users leave a online social network (OSN)? A rational answer should be, they leave
because their costs of staying in the network exceed, at a given point in time, their benefits of
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being members. This can be expressed by the dynamics:
si(t) = Θ [bi(t)− ci(t)] (1)
Here, si(t) characterizes the current state of user i at time t as a binary variable: si = 1 means
that the user is part of the network and si = 0 means that at time t the user leaves. Θ[z] is the
Heavyside function which returns 1 if z ≥ 0 and 0 if z < 0. Thus, the current state of user i
depends on the difference between its benefits bi(t) and costs ci(t).
In the following, we assume that the benefits of a user to join, and to stay, in the OSN result
from the reputation Xi(t) that the user receives from being connected to other users in the OSN.
There are many social networks that operate this way: in Twitter users get a reputation from
the number of their followers, in product review communities like Amazon or Youtube users earn
their reputation from the votes of other users. In our model, we particularly assume that the
reputation of a user, i, does not just depend on the sheer number of other users that follow i,
but also on their reputation. I.e. if a user j with a high reputation xj(t) connects to user i, the
latter receives more reputation than from a follower with low reputation.
Such a reputation measure can be explicitly displayed on the site, like the Reddit karma or the
RG score of Researchgate, which increases with the reputation of followers and the feedback
of the community. On the other hand, user reputation can be implicit and not part of a user
profile, but can still be perceived through the activity of other users. Examples of this implicit
reputation are retweets in Twitter and likes in Facebook.
We can express the impact of the followers on the reputation of a user by the following dynamics:
dXi
dt
=
N∑
j=1
aij(t)Xj(t)− φXi(t) (2)
The coefficients aij ’s are elements of the adjacency matrix of the OSN,A. They represent the link
between users j and i in the OSN at time t. These are unweighted, but directed links, because
it makes a difference whether user j follows user i, or the other way round. aij(t) = 1 if there is
a link from j to i, i.e. j is called a follower of i, and aij(t) = 0 otherwise. Since a user cannot
follow herself, we set aii(t) = 0 for all t.
The sum in Eq. (2) is over all users that can potentially link to i. That means if a number
of users leave the OSN, they are replaced by the same number of new users joining the OSN.
This way the total number of users, N , is kept constant. This is a first, and not necessarily the
most realistic, approximation to consider an entry and exit dynamics, which can be refined in
subsequent investigations. The second term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) takes into account the effort
to keep a certain level of reputation. Without a number of followers, the reputation of user i
cannot be maintained and thus decays exponentially over time with a rate φ. The larger φ, the
higher the effort to maintain the reputation.
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In order to relate reputation to the benefits of users in the OSN, we could simply assume that
benefits grow in proportion to reputation. On the other hand, the costs to stay in the OSN can
be assumed to be a constant τ equal for all users, which can be seen as the effort to login and
stay active. Note that there is no cost involved in maintaining links. According to Eq. (2) and
dependent on the specific social network, the reputation of users can grow to large numbers, while
on the other hand it can become infinitely small, but never zero. Because we are more interested
in the reputation of users relative to others, we will rescale the benefits from the reputation by
the largest value Xmax(t), which makes different networks more comparable. Hence, the benefits
and costs are specified in this model as follows:
bi(t) =
Xi(t)
Xmax(t)
∈ (0, 1) ; ci(t) = τ ∈ [0, 1) (3)
Note that, in contrast to Eq. (3), it is common to express the relative reputation in terms of the
sum of the individual reputations,
∑
Xi(t):
xi(t) =
Xi(t)∑
j Xj(t)
(4)
In the context of an OSN, however, this is unrealistic, as it requires that either the total reputation
or everyone’s reputation is public knowledge. For this reason, we posit that users compare their
reputation to the most reputable individual, who is often visible in rankings of user reputation.
We note that despite the conceptual difference, a solution to Eq. (3) can be mapped directly to
a corresponding solution to Eq. 4, by normalising xi with respect to xmax as follows:
xi(t)
xmax(t)
=
Xi(t)/
∑
j Xj(t)
Xmax(t)/
∑
j Xj(t)
=
Xi(t)
Xmax(t)
= bi(t) (5)
In Appendix A, we further show that an equilibrium solution to Eq. (2) is also an equilibrium
for bi(t) and xi(t) up to a scaling factor. This means that the entry/exit dynamics introduced in
Section 2.3 is invariant to the particular way in which users evaluate their relative reputation.
According to Eq. (1), users leave the OSN at time t if their relative reputation is lower than a
fixed threshold. Their links aij(t) are then set to zero, which according to Eq. (2) reduces the
reputation of other users j at the next time step. This can lead to cascades of users leaving the
OSN at consecutive time steps. The aim of our paper is to understand how a decrease of users’
motivation to stay because of an increase in their fixed costs τ will impact the OSN. Therefore,
as a next step, in Sect. 2.2 we first investigate how the reputation depends on the social network,
before turning to the entry/exit dynamics in Sect. 2.3.
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2.2 Quasistationary Equilibrium
Let us first discuss the reputation dynamics of users for a fixed social network. Expressing the
dynamics of bi(t) from Eq. (3) yields (see Appendix A):
dbi
dt
=
N∑
j=1
aijbj(t)− bi(t)
N∑
j=1
azjbj(t) (6)
where z is the index of the individual with highest absolute reputation Xmax. The first term
describes the reputation boost that individual i obtains from all her followers. The second term
is a scaling factor and represents the reputation decay with strength equal to the total boost in
reputation that user z receives.
Eigenvalues and eigenvectors The set of Eqs. (6) forms a linear dynamical system of
coupled first-order differential equations with the initial conditions described by the vector
b(0) = {b1(0), b2(0), ..., bN (0)}. The (constant in time) aij forms the elements of an adjacency
matrix A of size N ×N (see Figure 1).
At equilibrium we require b˙i = 0, hence
N∑
j=1
aijbj(t) = bi(t)
N∑
j=1
azjbj(t) (7)
In matrix form, this equation becomes
Ab(t) = b(t)
N∑
j=1
azjbj(t) (8)
If Xλ is an eigenvector of A with a corresponding eigenvalue λ, then rescaling Xλ will also
produce an eigenvector, i.e. bλ = Xλ/Xλmax is a solution to Eq. (8). In this case the scaling factor∑
j azjbj(t) gives the m
th component, (λbλ)m, of the vector λbλ. Since (λbλ)m = Xλm/Xλmax = 1,
it follows that
∑
j azjbj(t) = λ.
Since A is a real nonnegative matrix, the Perron-Frobenius Theorem tells us that the largest
eigenvalue of A, denoted by λ1, is real and positive (Bapat and Raghavan, 1997; Berman
and Plemmons, 1987). Furthermore, the corresponding Perron-Frobenius eigenvector bλ1 =
{bλ11 , bλ12 , ..., bλ1N }, is the only eigenvector with purely positive entries, and defines the reputa-
tion values of each user in equilibrium.
Let us illustrate this by the didactical example of a rather small network shown in Figure 1.
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A =

0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

1 2
3
4 5
Figure 1: Sketch of an OSN (right) that displays a core-periphery structure (see text) and the
corresponding adjacency matrix A (left)
The characteristic polynomial determining the eigenvalues of the corresponding adjacency matrix
A given in Figure 1 is
−λ5 + λ3 + λ2 = 0 (9)
and the largest eigenvalue is λ1= 1.32. The corresponding eigenvector gives us the absolute rep-
utation: Xλ1 = {2.32, 1.75, 1.32, 1.32, 1}. Rescaling this eigenvector by 1/Xλ1max gives the relative
reputation in equilibrium: bλ1 = {1, 0.75, 0.57, 0.57, 0.43}.
Core-periphery structure To facilitate the interpretation of the relative reputation values
in Figure 1, let us take a look at the corresponding network structure. This toy network already
shows a topological feature typical for many social networks, known as a core-periphery structure
(Capocci et al., 2006; Cattani and Ferriani, 2008; Corten, 2012; Hojman and Szeidl, 2008; Holme,
2005; Kumar et al., 2010; Vitali et al., 2011). Following Borgatti and Everett (2000); Everett
and Borgatti (2000), the core is defined as a cohesive subgroup (e.g. a clique, n-clique, n-club or
n-clan, k-plex) and the periphery is everything else.
Accordingly, and accounting for the directionality in reputation-based OSNs, we define the core,
Q, as the largest strongly-connected component (SCC) in the OSN. Each node in the SCC is
reachable from all other nodes in the SCC. The periphery consists of all nodes that do not
belong to the core. It is known that the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue λ1 of a directed OSN is
equal to the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of its largest SCC and can be used to characterise the
structure of the core Q (see Appendix B). In Figure 1, the core is the SCC formed by users 1,
2, 3, who mutually boost each others’ reputations. The periphery consists of users 4 and 5 who
only benefit from being connected to the core. The periphery usually contains simple chains of
users (4 → 5 ) which emanate from the core, in this case from user 2. The core itself does not
contain simple chains, but cycles, i.e. closed directed chains that involve n ≥ 2 users (Jain and
Krishna, 2002b). In the example, we observe two cycles, 1 → 2 → 1 and 1 → 2 → 3 → 1, i.e.
users can be part of more than one cycle. Moreover, all users have one follower each, except for
user 1 who has two followers, thus her reputation can be expected to be higher than that of the
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others. Note that even though users 4 and 5 have the same number of followers, their reputation
is different, as user 4 has a more reputable follower belonging to the core.
More formally, a cycle is defined as a subgraph in which there is a closed path from every node
of the subgraph back to itself. Cycles and structures of interlocking cycles represent irreducible
subgraphs. The core Q must always contain at least one cycle to qualify as a strongly connected
component. In Appendix B we show the dependency between the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue
and the length and number of the cycles in the core.
Direct and indirect reciprocity The shortest cycle, n = 2, expresses direct reciprocity, i.e.
in Figure 1 users 1 and 2 mutually follow each other and boost each other’s reputations. For
n ≥ 3, we have indirect reciprocity, i.e. user 2 follows 3, however, 3 does not follow 2, but follows
1 instead, and only 1 may follow 2, thus closing the loop.
Direct reciprocity is very common in OSN, e.g. in twitter or google+ it is seen as good practice
to link back to someone that has choosen to follow you or to have you as his/her friend. Likewise,
likes, +1, or shared posts often take reciprocity into account. Compared to this, indirect reci-
procity is more difficult to detect.To boost interaction along a chain of followers, and to hopefully
close the loop, some OSN, e.g. google+ or researchgate, indicate for each follower the number
of additional users that the user and the follower both have in common. This may increase the
likelihood of creating shortcuts and also shorter cycles.
Length of simple chains At equilibrium, dbi/dt = 0, we can insert the eigenvector bλ1
corresponding to λ1 into Eq. (6) to get∑
j
aijb
λ1
j = λ1b
λ1
i ; b
λ1
i =
1
λ1
∑
j
aijb
λ1
j (10)
This means that, in the long run, the reputation bi of user i is equal to the sum of the reputations
of all users j that follow i, attenuated by a factor 1/λ1 (Jain and Krishna, 1998, 2002b).
Eq. (10) allows us to draw some conclusions about the maximum length of simple chains involving
peripheral users. In the example discussed, we note that the reputations of users 4 and 5 are
related by the attenuation factor in Eq. (10) such that b4 = b2/λ1, b5 = b2/λ21, and in general
bn = b2/λ
n−1
1 for a chain of length n. If we require a simple chain to be exactly of length n,
bn > τ and bn+1 ≤ τ must hold. In other words, the nth peripheral user finds it beneficial to stay
while the (n+ 1)th leaves. Hence, we obtain for n:
n ∈
[
ln(b2/τ)
lnλ1
,
ln(b2/τ)
lnλ1
+ 1
)
; n =
⌈
ln(b2/τ)
lnλ1
⌉
(11)
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since we require n to be an integer value. The maximum length of a simple chain in a core-
periphery network thus depends on the cost level τ , the connectedness within the coreQ expressed
by the largest eigenvalue λ1, and the relative reputation of the core user who connects the core
to the chain (in our example user 2 ).
Unstable cores Imposing the condition n > 0 in Eq. (11) requires that λ1 > 1 and b2 > τ
which holds only if the OSN contains cycles. Without these cycles, λ1 = 0, i.e. the core-periphery
structure breaks down. The condition, b2 > τ , requires that the core user 2, who connects to the
simple chain, needs to obtain a net gain from participating in the OSN. Otherwise, due to the
attenuation factor in Eq. (10), none of the users in the chain would have an incentive to stay in
the network.
The special case of λ1 = 1 represents an important exception. In this case, and provided that
b2 > τ , the length of the simple chain is no longer bounded, since all users in the chain would have
the same relative reputation. More importantly, however, network structures like these are very
unstable, because core users have a reputation comparable to the periphery. In fact, peripheral
users can often obtain a higher reputation from multiple connections to the core, which reduces
the benefit of the core users and increases their likelihood of leaving. Different from peripheral
users, the leave of core users considerably affects other core users that are part of the same cycle.
This starts cascades of users leaving and thus destroys the core. Without the core, the periphery
would not be able to sustain its reputation and would break down as well.
Number and length of cycles Unstable core-periphery structures can be avoided as long
as interlocking cycles appear in the core. These contain users involved in multiple cycles which
in turn receive a much higher reputation and increase the benefit, i.e. the relative reputation,
also for others. Both the number of cycles in a network and their length have an impact on the
largest eigenvalue λ1 as illustrated in Appendix B. In general, we can conclude that λ1 increases
with the number of cycles, but decreases with the length of the cycle (keeping all other variables
constant).
The number of cycles in the network further depends on the average density m (average number
of links per user), a parameter discussed in the next section when we introduce the dynamics for
the network.
2.3 Network dynamics
In the previous section, we have explained that the reputation dynamics of Eq. (2), for a fixed
network, converges to an equilibrium state in which the relative reputations of users are fixed.
This convergence time defines the time scale for the reputation dynamics. Dependent on their
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stationary reputation value that defines their benefit in relation to their costs τ , Eq. (3), users
can decide to leave the OSN, Eq. (1), and will be replaced by new users joining the OSN. As
described above, we assume that Nexit(T ) = Nentry(T ), to keep N constant. T is the time at
which entry and exit happen. We assume that the time scale for entry and exit, i.e. for changing
the network structure, can be separated from the time scale of the reputation dynamics which
is much shorter. I.e. users make their decision based on the quasi-stationary benefit, which can
only change after the network has changed.
If a user leaves the OSN, all her (incoming and outgoing) links are set to zero. The newcomer
will establish the same number of incoming and outgoing links on average but, assuming that
she does not know all other users, these links will be distributed at random. We assume that
each user follows on average m other users. Precisely, there is a constant probability p that a
new user links to the (N − 1) other users, and m = p(N − 1) is a constant related to the average
density of a random OSN.
Our major interest in this paper is in the role of the cost τ that, according to Eqs. (1), (3) defines
the level at which users will leave the OSN, measured in terms of the relative reputation. The
latter is between zero and one, so τ gives the fractional benefit that has to be reached to stay
in the OSN. In our computer simulations, we will vary this level from zero to 0.5 to study the
impact of increasing costs.
τ=0 would imply no costs. To still allow for a network dynamics in this case, we apply the so-
called extremal dynamics. I.e. we choose the user with the lowest relative reputation, and force
her to leave the OSN, to allow a new user to enter. In case of several users with the same low b
value, we choose one of them randomly. The other limiting case τ = 1 would imply that all N
users will leave and be replaced by a completely new cohort. Then, the network at every time
T starts as a new random network, which has no chance to evolve. Hence, small or intermediate
values of τ would be most appropriate.
3 Results of computer simulations
3.1 Performance
How should one measure the “performance” of a OSN? Users join the OSN for a purpose and, as
we have explained in Sect. 2.1, here we assume that the benefits of users can be measured in terms
of their relative reputation, which should be possibly increased. This implies that not only the
number of followers is taken into account, but also their “value” in terms of their own reputation.
Hence, it would be obvious to use the long-term average over all users’ relative reputation as a
systemic measure whether or not the OSN fulfills the expectation of its users. This will serve as
a proxy for the performance of the OSN.
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Specifically, we build on the relative reputation, bi(T ), Eq. (3) of a user i, obtained in the quasi-
stationary limit at time T . Then, both Xi(t) and Xmax(t) can be expressed by the corresponding
values Xλ1i (T ) and X
λ1
max(T ) from the eigenvector Xλ1 and we find for the average reputation of
all N users
b¯(T ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi(T ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Xλ1i (T )
Xλ1max(T )
; 〈b〉 = 1
R
R∑
r=1
b¯r(Tmax) (12)
b¯(T ) refers to the population average at a given time T which can considerably fluctuate because
of stochastic influences when changing the network structure at every time step T . Therefore, we
define the long-term average benefit 〈b〉 which is a system average taken over a large number of
independent runs R, where the average satisfaction was measured after considerable long time
Tmax.
Figure 2: Long-term average benefit 〈b〉, Eqn. (12) for varying costs τ (left) and average num-
ber of links m (right).
The results of our simulations are shown in Fig. 2 for various values of the costs τ and the average
number of linksm. The most remarkable observation, prominently shown on the left side of Figure
2, is the maximum average benefit 〈b〉max for a non-zero cost at τmax=0.2. Counterintuitively, this
result implies that adding a cost for participating in an OSN maximises the average reputation
in the system.
The right part of Figure 2 demonstrates how this effect depends on the other important model
parameter, the average number m of users, a new user tends to follow. Here, we clearly observe
that for costs below τmax, m has almost no influence on the performance, which is interesting
enough because one would assume that a larger number of potential followers would always
improve the situation. Note, however, that the performance relates to the relative reputation,
i.e. Xi may increase with m but so does Xmax. For costs above τmax, we see a drastic decrease
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in the performance which depends on m in a much more pronounced way. In fact, there is a
non-monotonous dependence, i.e. increasing m in the range of small values will further decrease
the performance.
To better understand these interesting results about the improvement of performance with in-
creasing costs, we have to refer to the robustness of the OSN, which is inherently related to the
stability of the core-periphery structure already discussed in Sect. 2.2.
3.2 Robustness
A OSN is said to be robust if the decision of users to leave the OSN will not trigger large cascades
of further users leaving. Hence, we could use the sheer fraction of users remaining in the OSN at
time T , Y (T ) = 1−Nexit(T )/N , as a measure of its robustness. However, because this dropout
is always compensated by a number of new users entering the OSN, we will need a different
robustness measure.
We recall that the robustness of the OSN depends on the existence of a distinct core-periphery
structure for which the stability conditions are explained in Sect. 2.2 and Appendix C. This core-
periphery structure is challenged at every time T because of the entry and exit of users and the
corresponding formation and deletion of links. Therefore, cascades of users leaving can generally
not be avoided, as exemplified in Appendix C. However, such cascades should not destroy the
whole OSN, in particular not the core of the network that contributes the most to the average
benefit of its users and prevents the periphery from leaving the OSN.
Consequently, we will use the life time ΩQ of the core Q (measured in network time T ) as a proxy
for the robustness of the OSN. Because of considerable fluctuations, similar to performance, we
will use the average 〈ΩQ〉 taken over a considerable long time Tmax (and possibly also averaged
over a large number R of independent runs).
Figure 4 in Appendix D illustrates, for a sample network, that the robustness measure 〈ΩQ〉 is
maximized for the optimal cost level τmax=0.2. Specifically, we notice a non-monotonous behav-
ior. The lifetime of the core-periphery structure is mostly threaten by peripheral users attracting
followers, without reciprocally contributing to the benefit of others (see Appendix C). A non-zero
cost, 0 < τ < τmax, prevents this “behavior” to some extent, but a cost too high, τmax < τ < 1,
rather destroys the core and, hence, the depending periphery.
Because of the fact that both performance and robustness are maximized for the optimal cost
level τmax=0.2, one could argue that performance is simply a substitute of robustness. This
simplified explanation, however, does not hold. As Appendix C shows in detail, the core can be
destroyed by cascades that involve core users. But the replacement of users leaving by new users
at each time step T also bears the chance that random rewiring leads to the recovery of the core,
thanks to new users linked to the core.
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That means, to maximize performance not only the life time of the core matters, but also the
recovery time ΠQ it takes to rebuild the core. The OSN should recover quickly, to not affect
the long-term benefit of its users. As Figure 4 in Appendix D shows for a sample network, the
averaged recovery time 〈ΠQ〉 of the core-periphery structure becomes shorter if τ increases, i.e.
if more new users enter the OSN, and new links increase the chance of establishing reciprocal
relations. But, again, if the randomness associated with this process becomes too high, favorable
structures may get destroyed. A small, but considerable cost τmax=0.2 is able to balance these
counteracting processes.
In conclusion, the cost value τmax=0.2 optimizes the ratio between these two time spans, the
average life time of the core, 〈ΩQ〉, and the average recovery time of the core, 〈ΠQ〉. Their
combined impact, i.e. maximizing 〈ΩQ〉 while minimizing 〈ΠQ〉 only explains the maximum of
performance 〈b〉, as discussed in detail in Appendix D.
3.3 Core size and largest eigenvalue
In Sect. 2.2 we already shortly discussed how an increase in cost τ affects the structure of the
OSN. In particular, the length of both simple chains and of cycles of followers will be reduced
(Eq. (11)). This results in a decreasing size Q of the core built by users that belong to one
or more cycles. Figure 3 shows the histogram of the core sizes, P (Q) for two different costs,
τ=0 and τ=0.25, where the first one is only used as a reference case. One recognizes that, with
increasing cost, the distribution gets more skewed, with its maximum shifted to smaller values of
Q. To allow for a real comparison of the different simulations, we have taken into account only
those realizations where the core-periphery structure encompasses the whole network (i.e. one
connected component, and no isolated users, or groups of users). Figure 5 shown in Appendix
E also illustrates the structure of the resulting OSN. One clearly observes that with increasing
costs there is a tendency of users in the core to follow more other users.
The second structural insight comes from the histogram of the largest eigenvalue, P (λ1), shown
in the right part of Figure 3. Compared to the case with no costs, we observe a considerably
broader distribution, with the maximum shifted to a larger value of λ1. I.e. with increasing costs,
there is a much larger likelihood to find larger values of λ1, which implies shorter simple chains
and shorter cycles. In line with the argumentation in Appendix B, we can also confirm that larger
λ1 correspond to more cycles inside the core, and thus larger average reputation, which can be
verified by comparing the snapshots of Figure 5.
We remind that the condition (11) only refers to simple cycles and simple chains, that is, chains
in which each user has exactly one follower. If users have several followers, their benefit-to-cost
difference can overcome the condition (11) even if their position in the chain or in the cycle
would not allow for this. And such users automatically boost the reputation of all other users
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Figure 3: (left) Distribution P (Q) of core sizes Q, (right) Distribution P (λ1) of the largest
eigenvalue λ1. (red) τ = 0, (green τ = 0.25). Other parameters N = 100, m = 0.25, Tmax = 106
downstream. As the cost τ increases, having more than one follower becomes crucial in particular
for peripheric users to stay. Having more than one follower, on the other hand, also increases the
chance of creating new cycles, which in turn increases λ1. This again feeds back both on the core
and the periphery of the OSN, increasing the pressure towards a more compact core and shorter
chains. Hence, it is in fact the relation with λ1 that facilitates the role of the cost τ in shaping
the network.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have proposed an agent-based model of online social networks (OSN) which
captures several generic features of such networks:
Core-periphery structure Most OSNs are characterised by a core of active users that are
closely linked to each other, and a periphery of less active users that are loosely connected to the
core. Empirical studies have shown (Garcia et al., 2017, 2013) that the core of OSN is not only
quite large, compared to the size of the OSN, but also “deep”, i.e. most users are well integrated
in the OSN. Our model is able to reproduce such a structure, but also to explain its origin, as a
combination of direct and indirect reciprocity. The former implies mutual directed links between
two users, whereas the latter occurs if users are part of closed cycles and thus benefit from others
through the cycle.
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Reputation dynamics Many models of OSN take the number of “friends”, i.e. direct links
between users into accout and take degree and traditional centrality metrics as proxies of a
user’s reputation (Kwak et al., 2010; Magno and Weber, 2014; Niven et al., 2015). Our model,
in contrast, not only considers that such social relations are directional, i.e. a link from user j to
i does not necessarily implies a link from i to j. It also explicitely takes the different impact of
users into account, weighting it by means of a (generalized) reputation. Noteworthy, reputation
is not determined by the user herself, instead it results from the interaction with others. A user
is said to have a high reputation if it is followed by many other users of high reputation. I.e. in
addition to the number of followers, also their value is taken into account. Reputation that is
not actively maintained will fade out in the course of time. I.e. users that are not able to attract
followers automatically loose in impact.
Cost-benefit analysis In our model, users join the OSN for a purpose. That means they bear
costs, to obtain some benefit. If their costs are higher than their benefits, users leave the OSN.
Hence, our model includes an entry-exit dynamics which is motivated by rational arguments.
We have assumed that a user’s benefit increases with the number of followers it attracted, which
in turn boost its reputation. Hence, benefits are measured by the relative reputation of a user,
scaled by the maximum reputation in the OSN. The latter allows us to better compare OSNs of
different sizes and link densities. Costs, on the other hand, are assumed to be fixed, they include
for example the effort of using the website or to maintain a profile.
Our main focus in this paper was on the role of the cost τ incurred for every active users.
Increasing τ would imply a pressure on users to leave because it worsens their cost-benefit
relation. This short-term negative effect, however, has a positive influence on the core-periphery
structure of the OSN. As we demonstrate in this paper, an optimal cost level is able to increase
the long-term benefit of users in terms of a higher relative reputation.
Performance In order to extimate the impact of increasing costs, we have defined the long-
term benefit averaged over the whole OSN, 〈b〉, as a performance measure. Intuition would
suggest that 〈b〉 monotonously decreases with increasing costs up to a point where the whole
OSN collapses. Interestingly, this picture does not hold for comparably small cost values. On the
contrary, a small cost up to τmax=0.2 improves the situation, i.e. the long-term benefit increases
compared to a reference case without any cost (where no user would leave). In other words, a
small cost forces those users to leave which were never able to attract any follower. This, in our
model, gives way to new users that might be more successful in this respect.
Robustness As a second important insight, we analyze both mathematically and by means
of computer simulations how increasing costs change the structure, and hence the robustness, of
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the OSN. Our model is set up in a way that it allows to express the outcome of the reputation
dynamics by λ1, the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix that describes the interaction
between users, i.e. who follows whom. We verified that an increasing cost τ leads to higher values
of λ1, which means a smaller, but more compact core and, most remarkably, in an increasing
likelihood to have more than one follower. This, on the other hand, increases the direct and
indirect reciprocity that characterizes the core.
Robustness implies that cascades of users leaving will not destroy the core, i.e. the life time of
the core can be used as a proxy measure of robustness. We have shown that this life time is
maximized for the optimal cost value τmax=0.2.
We emphasize that the above conclusions are obtained from a model that, as every model, only
captures part of the features of real OSN. The value of the model is in what it is able to produce
despite some of the simplified assumptions. Our insights now allow us to specifically search for
optimal cost-benefit relations, or to test other assumptions to calculate the benefit.
Why is this issue important? First of all, there are costs involved in being a member of an
OSN, even if they are implicit. These include, among others, the efforts to login and to retain
one’s own social network (e.g. by maintaining regular information stream), the effort of learning
how to efficiently use the GUI of the provider, or the effort to adapt to changes in the GUI.
The latter can make it harder to maintain social contacts, at least temporarily. As Garcia et al.
(2013) argued, it was ill-timed interface changes that caused the massive dropout of users from
Frienster, which came at a time when new competitors, such as Facebook, were ramping up in
popularity.
There is a second issue involved in this discussion. Even if most users enjoy participating in
an OSN free of charge, companies would like to know these users would respond, if at some
point in time costs such as monthly membership fees are introduced. Will members remain loyal,
or will this lead to a massive exodus of users, making the OSN less attractive for investors?
Subsequently, if users leave how would this affect the OSN? What will be the impact of less
active users leaving compared to core users leaving? What incentives should be introduced to
keep power users engaged?
With our agent-based modeling framework that consider both entry-exit dynamics and cost-
benefit considerations of users, we are able to address such questions. It also helps to better
understand the relation between the integration of users and the overall performance of the
OSN, which allows to formally consider issues such as user satisfaction and service quality.
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Appendix A: Absolute and relative reputation
In this Appendix, we show that the equilibrium absolute reputations given by a stationary solu-
tion to Eq. (2) are a scaled representation of the equilibrium relative reputations x and b.
Let us rewrite Eq. (2) in matrix form:
dX(t)
dt
= AX(t)− φX(t) (13)
It is clear that an equilibrium exists only if φ is an eigenvalue ofA. In this case, the corresponding
eigenvector gives the equilibrium absolute reputation. Additionally, as φ represents a decay rate,
and Xi(t) ≥ 0 for all i, we require that the matrixA has at least one positive eigenvalue, and that
its corresponding eigenvector does not have negative components. As A is a non-negative real
matrix, we obtain these conditions from the Perron-Frobenius theorem (see main text). However,
we are still bound by a limited set of values for the decay rate.
To avoid this last restriction, a common transformation is to normalise the absolute reputation,
Xi(t), with respect to the total reputation in the system. By doing so, the free parameter φ
disappears, provided it is the same for all users. More importantly, using such relative reputation
is more plausible in an OSN where individuals tend to evaluate their benefit with respect to
others, rather than to an arbitrary absolute scale.
Let xi(t) = Xi(t)/
∑
j Xj(t). Then we can express the dynamics of xi(t) as follows:
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dxi(t)
dt
=
dXi(t)
dt
(∑
j Xj(t)
)
(∑
j Xj(t)
)2 − Xi(t)
d
(∑
j Xj(t)
)
dt(∑
j Xj(t)
)2 = dXi(t)/dt∑
j Xj(t)
− xi(t)
d
∑
j Xj(t)/dt∑
j Xj(t)
=
∑
j aijXj(t)− φXi(t)∑
j Xj(t)
− xi(t)
∑
j
∑
k ajkXk(t)− φXj(t)∑
j Xj(t)
=
∑
j
aijxj(t)−φxi(t) +φxi(t)− xi(t)
∑
j
∑
k
ajkxk(t)
=
∑
j
aijxj(t)− xi(t)
∑
j
∑
k
ajkxk(t) (14)
In matrix form Eq. (14) becomes:
dx(t)
dt
= Ax(t)− x(t)
∑
j
∑
k
ajkxk(t) (15)
The equilibrium solutions to Eq. (15) are given by the eigenvectors of A. If Xλ is one such
eigenvector with a corresponding eigenvalue λ, then the rescaled vector xλ = Xλ/
∑
iX
λ
i is also
an eigenvector, and the constant,
∑
j
∑
k ajkxk(t), equals λ.
However, defining relative reputation in this way, presumes that either everyone’s reputation or
the total reputation in the system is common knowledge. This is unlikely to be the case in any
OSN. For this reason, we normalise Xi(t) with respect to the individual with maximum absolute
reputation Xmax(t).
Let bi(t) = Xi(t)/Xmax(t). The dynamics of bi(t) becomes:
dbi(t)
dt
=
dXi(t)
dt
Xmax(t)
Xmax(t)2
−
Xi(t)
dXmax(t)
dt
Xmax(t)2
==
dXi(t)
dt
1
Xmax(t)
− bi(t) 1
Xmax(t)
dXmax(t)
dt
=
∑
j aijXj(t)
Xmax(t)
− φ Xi(t)
Xmax(t)
− bi(t) 1
Xmax(t)
∑
j
azjXj(t)− φXmax(t)

=
∑
j
aijbj(t)−φbi(t) +φbi(t)− bi(t)
∑
j
azjbj(t) =
∑
j
aijbj(t)− bi(t)
∑
j
azjbj(t) (16)
where z is the index of the individual with the highest absolute reputation Xmax(t).
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In a similar manner, a rescaled eigenvector of A, bλ = Xλ/Xλmax, is an equilibrium solution to
Eq. (16). In this case the constant,
∑
j azjbj(t) again equals λ.
To summarise, an eigenvector Xλ of A is a solution to both Eq. (15) and Eq. (16). This shows
that the two ways of defining relative information are in fact equivalent, up to a scaling factor.
Appendix B: Impact of cycles on λ1
To further illustrate the impact of the network structure, in particular the number and the length
of cycles, on the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, we present some didactical examples
in Table 1.
Adjacency matrix Corresponding network
[1]
A =
0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0

λ1=1
bλ1=(1, 1, 1)
1
2
3
[2]
A =

0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0

λ1=1.22
bλ1=(0.819, 0.671, 1, 0.55)
1
2
3
4
[3]
A =

0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0

λ1=1.36904
bλ1=(0.73, 0.533, 1, 0.835, 0.61)
1
2
3
4 5
[4]
A =

0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

λ1=1.194
bλ1=(0.838, 0.702, 1, 0.588, 0.492)
1
2
3
4
5
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[5]
A =

0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0

λ1=1.325
bλ1=(0.755, 0.57, 1, 0.755, 0.57, 0.43)
1
2
3
4
5
6
Table 1: Examples of how the network structure affects the adjacency matrix
The example [1] has the largest eigenvalue of λ1= 1, and the corresponding eigenvector gives
the same relative reputation for every user. A possible next step in the evolution of the core
structure is shown in [2] where a new user 4 joins the network. User 2 follows this newcomer,
who in turn links itself back to user 3. The core is now composed of two cycles of length 3 and 4.
As a consequence, λ1 jumps up from 1 to a new value 1.22. Hence, the addition of a cycle to the
core increases λ1. With this, the reputation of the users in the core is no longer homogeneous.
Because of her two followers, user 3 has the highest relative reputation, wheres user 4, being the
last in the cycle starting with user 3 has the lowest reputation.
If a new user 5 joins the core structure, this time adding a 2-cycle, as shown in [3], this results
in a further increase of λ1 and a re-shuffling in the reputation vector. User 3 is still dominant,
but now user 4 is able to boost her own reputation thanks to user 5. This leaves user 2 as the
loser in this new configuration.
To illustrate the the effect of cycle sizes on the core structure, imagine that user 5 joined the
network in a different way. Instead of creating a 2-cycle, she might have extended an existing one,
as shown in [4]. The core now consists of a 3-cycle and a 5-cycle, everything else being the same
(i.e. user 2 still follows two other users and user 3 still has two followers). Yet, this alternative
addition of user 5 has the effect of reducing the value of λ1: it is now λ1= 1.194, down from 1.22
before. User 3 is still dominant, but now user 5, being the last in the cycle starting at user 3,
has the lowest population. This core structure would be unfeasible in a system with a cost level
τ= 0.5, since user 5 would decide to leave.
Let us go back to the sustainable core structure shown in [3]. Imagine that the 2-cycle is expanded
by user 6 following user 4 and being followed by user 5 (shown in [5]). Again, the effect of
increasing the length of the cycle was to reduce λ1.
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To summarize these observations we conclude that adding a cycle to an existing core while
keeping all else equal increases the value of λ1. On the other hand, if the number of cycles is
kept constant, then increasing the length of a cycle decreases the value of λ1.
Appendix C: Cascades of users leaving the OSN
Table 2 shows consecutive steps without cost (τ1=0, left column) and with optimal cost (τ2=0.2,
right column), to illustrate how cascades of users leaving the OSN emerge. The initial configu-
ration (STEP T0) shown in Table 2 has a core-periphery structure (users 1, 2, 3 belong to the
core coloured in red, and users 4, 5 to the periphery). Users coloured in grey leave the OSN at
the given time step. In the initial configuration user 5 has the lowest relative reputation of 0.24
and will leave the network because, according to Sect. 2.3, it is assumed that even with b > τ
at least one user, i.e. the one with the least benefit, will leave to ensure the network dynamics
for both cost levels. In the next time step, it will be replaced by another user 5 with a different
connections to the network. Because of the tightly connected core, most dropout events during
subsequent time steps (not shown) will likely affect only the periphery, replacing users 4 and 5.
However, due to the random rewiring of m incoming and outgoing links for each new user, con-
figurations like the ones shown at a later STEP T1 of Table 2 can appear. In fact, the consecutive
steps T1-T4 are drawn from real simulations of this small OSN (see also Appendix D).
Interestingly, in STEP T1 the peripheral users attract a number of incoming links. This may not
happen immediately at their entry, but we assume that, within one time step T , after a short
relaxation time users become known to at least part of the network and then are able to receive
incoming links, as well as they get to know part of the network to establish outgoing links to
existing users. Because of this link structure, the peripheral users can receive the same relative
reputation (printed below each snapshot) as the core users. I.e. all users become susceptible to
dropout in the same manner. In the example user 1 (left column) and user 2 (right column)
will leave because, among users with the same low reputation, one is chosen at random. Their
dropout leads to a smaller core and, consequently, to a lower relative reputation of core users
which becomes even lower than the one of peripheral users. This in turn determines further core
users to leave as it is shown at STEP T2. In the right column, user 1, which was a follower of the
previous user 2, leaves now. In the left column, a new user 1 has entered the OSN, but (because
of the random rewiring process) fails to establish links to other users, or to attract other links.
Hence, this user is also determined to leave at the current time step. In the consecutive STEP
T3, the cascade of core users leaving further erodes the structure of the core and hence also
affects the peripheral users as shown in STEP T4. In conclusion, after the core was affected by
the cascades in STEP T1, the OSN could no longer remain resilient.
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As the snapshots of Table 2 come from real computer simulations, we can also tell that it took a
considerable time before, because of random rewiring, a new core of users emerged. Precisely, the
recovery time was Trecovery=492 in the case of τ1=0, but only Trecovery=297 in the case of τ2=0.2.
As this example indicates, the emergence of cascades of users leaving is largely independent of
the precise cost level. However the time for the OSN to recover and the average life time of the
core significantly depends on it. This is quantitatively analysed in Appendix D.
STEP T0
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(1, 1, 1, 0.49, 0.24)
〈b〉=0.74
τ1 = 0 τ2 = 0.2
STEP T1
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
〈b〉=1
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
〈b〉=1
STEP T2
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(0, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0.5)
〈b〉=0.5
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(0.5, 1, 0.5, 0.5, 1)
〈b〉=0.7
STEP T3
23/26
F. Schweitzer, P. Mavrodiev, A. M. Seufert, D. Garcia:
Modeling User Reputation in Online Social Networks: The Role of Costs, Benefits, and Reciprocity
(Submitted for publication)
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(1, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 0.5)
〈b〉=0.7
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(0.5, 1, 0.5, 0.5, 1)
〈b〉=0.7
STEP T4
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
〈b〉=0.2
1
2
3
4 5
bλ1=(0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
〈b〉=0.2
Table 2: Examples of emerging cascades of users leaving (obtained from computer simulations,
see also Appendix D). The top row shows the initial configuration of a sample OSN. Subsequent
rows show consecutive time steps of the evolution of the OSN, measured in network time T1-T4
for two different cost levels: (left column) τ1 = 0, (right column) τ2 = 0.2. (red) indicates core
users, (grey) indicates users leaving at the given time step. The relative reputation bλ1 of users
and the average reputation 〈b〉, Eqn. (12), is given for each configuration.
Appendix D: Optimal cost level
To illustrate how the cost, τ , affects the average reputation in the network, we simulated the
dynamics of a small network of five nodes over Tmax = 104 network time steps. The left part of
Figure 4, which should be compared with the left part of Figure 2, shows the average reputation
of the OSN. We observe again that for our small network the maximum average benefit is attained
for a nonzero cost. More precisely, we confirm that the optimal cost is τmax=0.2, as it was for
the much larger network simulated in Figure 2, so this cannot be attributed to a size effect.
Furthermore, at this optimal cost level, the network is not considerably disturbed as the average
number of new users is less than 40% of the network size. This shows that the maximum average
benefit is not concentrated in a minority of core users, at the expense of a large and sparsely
connected periphery.
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Figure 4: (Left) Long term average benefit 〈b〉, Eqn. (12) (blue, left scale), and average fraction
of rewired users over the whole simulation (red, right scale) . (Right) Average lifetime of a core,
〈ΩQ〉 (blue), and average time to establish a core, 〈ΠQ〉 (green), both measured in network time
T , as a function of the cost τ . The Wilcoxon-rank test shows that 〈ΩQ〉τ=0.2 is significantly
different from 〈ΩQ〉τ=0.1 (p-value = 0.02) and from 〈ΩQ〉τ=0.3 (p-value = 10−8)
The right part of Figure 4 explains why this particular value of τ appears to be the optimal
one. Here, we have plotted two different time spans, the average lifetime of a core, 〈ΩQ〉, and
the average time to establish a core, 〈ΠQ〉, both measured in network time T , as a function of
the cost τ . With the exception of τ=0, which only serves as a reference case, the time 〈ΠQ〉 to
establish a core in the OSN monotonously increases with τ until it reaches a saturation value at
high levels of τ → 1. As explained in Sect. 2.3, this increase is due to the increasing number of
users that leave the OSN at each time step T . If τ gets too large, a considerable fraction of the
OSN is replaced, this way also destroying favorable reciprocal social links. For large τ the average
life time of the core, 〈ΩQ〉, decreases for the very same reasons. For small τ , however, we observe
a non-monotonous behavior, i.e. the life time increases with τ until it reaches a maximum at
τmax=0.2. I.e. the optimal cost level balances two different dynamic effects: (a) the emergence of
a core of users that, by means of direct or indirect reciprocity, keep a relatively high reputation,
and (b) the maintainence of this core by the users. Cascades of users leaving cannot be prevented
as we have explained in Appendix B. The question is how fast the OSN is able to cope with it.
At the optimal cost level, the core not only stays alive, but also quickly recovers from the leave
of core users. Therefore the average reputation of most of the users remain high over time.
Appendix E: Network structure
Here we present three typical snapshots of the network structure for different values of the cost
τ . In all three simulations, the parameter that determines the network density is fixed to m=0.25
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and the system size is N=100. The most immediate differences in these three snapshots are (i)
the core size, which strongly decreases with increasing cost τ and (ii) the maximum out-degree
which increases with increasing cost τ . These findings are in agreement with our theoretical
discussions in Sect. 2.2 about changes in the largest eigenvalues λ1 dependent on the network
structure (i.e. the existence of chains and cycles).
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Figure 5: Sample networks for different cost τ . (left) τ=0.0. λ1=1.133, number of users in the
core: 31. The largest out-degree is 5. In total, there are 3 users (71, 28, and 24) with 5 outgo-
ing links. (middle) τ=0.2. λ1=1.47, number of users in the core: 21 The largest outdegree is 7.
User 7 has 7 outgoing links, user 36 has 6, and at least five users (49, 91, 26, 54, and 45) have
5. (right) τ=0.3. λ1=1.40, number of users in the core: 7. The largest outdegree is 10. Two
users (34 and 76) have outdegree 10, one (49) has out-degree 7 and one (87) has out-degree 6.
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